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I. INTRODUCTION
When First Amendment lawyers wax eloquent about freedom of
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support of the Dean's Research Fund of Rutgers School of Law-Newark and the research
assistance of Virginia Cora, class of 2002. An earlier version of this paper was delivered as
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speech, they almost invariably turn to New York Times v. Sullivan,' a
decision that unquestionably qualifies as a First Amendment icon. Sullivan
involved a defamation claim against the New York Times and several civil
rights leaders for an advertisement printed in the Times that condemned the
2conduct of the Montgomery, Alabama police force. When free speech
devotees mention Sullivan, they almost invariably quote the following
passage from Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court:
[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
3
The Sullivan case dealt primarily with a mass media entity, the New
York Times,4 and media organizations have been the most zealous
guardians of Sullivan and its progeny-virtually every major United States
Supreme Court defamation case has involved a media defendant.
Discussions in the mass media, such as newspapers, television, radio, and
magazines, may reflect a somewhat diverse array of perspectives, but most
of these channels of communication are controlled by sizeable
organizations.5 Size often leads to expression of conventional viewpoints,
6not the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate celebrated in Sullivan.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 256-59.
3. Id. at 270. Perhaps a precursor to this statement was the earlier observation that "it
has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy that 'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public."' Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 633 (1994) (quoting
U.S. v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (quoting Associated Press v.
U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))). See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the
Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 561, 563, 565 (2000) (highlighting the Supreme Court's statement in Associated
Press).
4. There were non-media defendants involved in Sullivan, though they were only
defendants because they had placed an advertisement in the New York Times. Of course, the
case had implications for non-media entities and individuals even when they did not utilize
the mass media. See Bernard W. Bell, Byron R. White, Kennedy Justice, 51 STAN. L. Rv.
1373, 1405 (1999).
5. PATRICIA AuFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 88-94
(1999); Benkler, supra note 3, at 564-65; David Waterman, CBS-Viacom and the Effects of
Media Mergers: An Economic Perspective, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 531, 540-42 (2000); Paul
Wellstone, Growing Media Consolidation Must Be Examined to Preserve Our Democracy,
52 FED. COMM. L.J. 551, 552 (2000) ("Today fewer than ten multinational media
conglomerates-Time/Warner, Disney, Rupert Murdoch's NewsCorp, Viacom, Sony,
Seagram, AT&T/Liberty Media, Bertelsmann, and GE-dominate most of the American
mass media landscape.").
6. See AUFDERHEIDE, supra note 5, at 94; BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY
37, 39, 41-43, 46-47, 103, 226 (1983); Benkler, supra note 3, at 564-65, 576. At least one
scholar has theorized that a more concentrated broadcast market might provide greater
programming diversity than would a more disaggregated industry. Peter 0. Steiner,
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The Internet has, in many ways, moved society closer to the ideal
Justice Brennan set forth so eloquently in Sullivan. It has not only made
debate on public issues more "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," but has
similarly invigorated discussion of non-public issues. By the same token,
the Internet has empowered smaller entities and even individuals, enabling
them to widely disseminate their messages and, indeed, reach audiences as
broad as those of established media organizations.7
For example, in April 2000, a wildly inaccurate summary of New
York Mets Manager Bobby Valentine's comments to a group of students at
the Wharton School was posted on the Internet by one of the students. The
student, who adopted "Brad34" as his Internet name, had no journalistic
training nor work experience for any news organization that would attempt
to ensure the accuracy of his material. Brad34's concededly "inventive"
summary of Valentine's remarks caused such controversy that the Mets
General Manager flew to Pittsburgh to confront Valentine regarding his
alleged statements. Sportswriter George Vecsey succinctly described the
incident's denouement-"After four days, the Mets sorted out this foray
into the wonderful world of the Web, where anybody with a mouse can be
Matt Drudge.
'
A second example involved renowned fashion designer Tommy
Hilfiger. Internet postings "reported" two appearances of the designer.
During the first, an interview on CNN's Style With Elsa Klensch, Hilfiger
allegedly asserted that Asians did not look good in his clothes. During the
second interview, which reportedly took place on an episode of Oprah,
Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio
Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952); THOMAs G. KRATrENMAKER,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 88-91 (2d ed. 1998).
7. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (stating that "[t]hrough the use of chat
rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates
farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and
newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer."); Stephen C. Jacques,
Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the First Amendment, and the
Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1945, 1989 (1997) (internal citations omitted)
(observing that "[t]he Internet, however, breaks down these barriers, offering an egalitarian
form of communication where the cost is little or nothing and an opinion is instantaneously
distributed worldwide. In many ways, the Internet embodies the essences of democracy:
equal participation."); Amy Harmon, Ideas & Trends: Anarchic E-Commerce: Online
Davids vs. Corporate Goliaths, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, § 4, at 1 (discussing individuals'
ability to "upset the status quo" with copyrights); but see Los Angeles Times v. Free
Republic, No. CV 98-7840, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1998)
(granting summary judgment for plaintiffs, stating that defendant's fair use defense would
not apply to its copying of news articles onto its Web site).
8. George Vecsey, Sports of The Times: Can a Fish Bring Peace to Metland?, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 19, 2000, at Dl; see also Tyler Kepner, Valentine's Comments Prompt a Visit
From Phillips, N.Y. TMEs, Apr. 15,2000, at Dl.
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Hilfiger allegedly made a similar comment regarding African Americans.
Though the reports were widely disseminated and ultimately prompted a
public denial by Hilfiger, it turned out that not only had Hilfiger not made
the comments, but he had never appeared on either show.9
The very "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" nature of the Internet
illustrated by the previous episodes, as well as others, 0 has provoked varied
attempts to control speech on the Internet. Among such efforts is the
promotion of filtering software," for use not just by private individuals, but
12by public libraries as well . The demand for filters mostly stems from
9. Designer Hilfiger Disputes Net Rumors of Racism, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 1999,
available at http:llwww.usatoday.comllifelcyberltecb/ctalO9.htm. Similarly, the theory that
TWA 800 was destroyed by a missile fired from a military aircraft remained popular on the
Internet, long after the traditional press had concluded that it had little credence. Theory
That Missile Brought Down TWA Flight 800 (ABC television broadcast, June 1, 2000)
(reporting that for four years investigators have been pressured by persistent individuals
who "use the Internet to promote their theory and to keep the issue visible"). See also
Randal C. Archibald, 2000 Campaign: The Myth; Both Oppose E-Mail Tax Bill (Good,
Because it Doesn't Exist), N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2000, at B5.
10. See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D.
Or. 1998). See also Leslie Wayne, Regulators Confront Web Role in Politics, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 21, 2000, at A16 (In "parsing the differences between Web campaigning and bricks-
and-mortar electioneering," the Federal Election Commission "is wading into the complex
new world of the Internet, where the political reach is broad and costs are low."); Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DuKE L.J.
855, 863-64 (2000) ("Although Internet communications may have the ephemeral qualities
of gossip with regard to accuracy, they are communicated through a medium more pervasive
than print.").
11. There are a number of different types of filtering software. Some block out sites that
contain certain words, some block out sites identified by reviewers who examine each site,
and others allow access only to sites that reviewers have examined and found to be
acceptable. For a more detailed description of the different types of filtering software, see
Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in
Public and School Libraries: What Content Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEx. L. REV.
1117,1120 (2000).
12. There have been pressures placed on public libraries to install filtering software on
terminals that provide access to the Internet. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the
Loudoun Cty. Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998) ["Loudoun "]; see also Elisabeth
Werby, The Cyber-Library: Legal and Policy Issues Facing Public Libraries in the High-
Tech Era, in FILTERS & FREEDOM: FREE SPEECH PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNET CONTENT
CONTROLS 143, 147-48 (Electronic Privacy Information Center ed., 1999) (discussing the
efforts to censor the Internet in public libraries) [hereinafter FILTERS & FREEDOM]. Many
libraries offer Internet access. Rolando Jos6 Santiago, Internet Access in Public Libraries: A
First Amendment Perspective, 32 URB. LAW. 259, 260 (2000). Many libraries also employ
filtering software. Congress has enacted federal legislation requiring use of filtering
software by schools and libraries that receive federal funding. Children's Internet Protection
Act ("CHIP Act") in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554
(2000). As of November 2000, at least five states had filtering legislation on the books, and
another nineteen were considering similar initiatives. ABC News, Coping With Filtering
Law (Nov. 6, 2000), at http://www.abcnews.go.comlsections/techlDailyNews/
netmonitoring001 106.html.
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concerns about sexually explicit material, 13 even though filters have been
developed for other uses, such as blocking sites containing racially and
ethnically derogatory speech. 14 The controversy swirling around the use of
filtering software by public libraries raises issues that, as this Article will
argue, have yet to be resolved satisfactorily.
In particular, this Article will argue that conventional approaches to
analyzing the constitutional issues raised by public libraries' increasing use
of Internet filtering software are flawed, because they focus on the interests
of speakers rather than the interests of their audiences, and that the interests
of recipients of information are paramount in the public library setting.
This Article suggests that libraries are the preeminent audience forum, and
that librarians should have limited power in precluding Internet access to
materials that satisfy their patrons' intellectual interests. This Article
contends, however, that libraries can place lesser value on materials that are
not primarily focused on intellectual enlightenment, such as sexually
explicit material directed toward the audience's prurient interests. Finally,
this Article asserts that the courts should consider procedural protection of
First Amendment freedoms in the public library context.
The pressures have not just been restricted to government computers owned by
public libraries. There has been pressure on state universities to use filtering software to
restrict access to all who use university computers, including faculty members and
researchers. Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Okla. 1997). There have also been
restrictions on the use of state-owned computers by state employees in general. Urofsky v.
Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1999). Finally, there have also been pressures to place
filters on elementary and secondary school terminals. Anemonia Hartocollis, Board Blocks
Student Access to Web Sites, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 10, 1999, at B1.
13. In 1998, the House of Representatives estimated that there were 28,000 such sites.
Sarah E. Warren, Filtering Sexual Material on the Internet: Public Libraries Surf the Legal
Morass, 73 FLA. B.L 52 (Oct. 1999) (citation omitted).
Within sexually oriented speech, one must distinguish between obscene speech,
which governments can constitutionally ban, and merely indecent speech, which
government cannot. Speech is obscene, and thus may be prohibited if:
(a)... 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest (b) ... the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c)... the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
14. See What is HateFilter?, at http:llwww.adl.orglhate-patrollinfo/ (ast visited Feb. 7,
2001) (describing the Anti-Defamation League's ("ADL") HateFilter software); Christopher
Wolf, Racists, Bigots and the Law on the Internet, at http://www.adl.org/
intemet/intemetlawl.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001). The ADL has developed HateFilter,
which is designed for parents to use on home computers to filter out some of the most
offensive hate sites. The software is primarily intended for use as an educational tool; it
blocks access to sites and redirects the user to information about hate groups at the ADL
homepage.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
A. Government's Dual Role as Regulator and Proprietor"s
Under the conception of government held by the Framers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, government primarily acted as
16
regulator, limiting citizens' conduct for the public good. The founding
generation assumed that citizens could live their lives largely without
government assistance. 7 Citizens primarily expected government to
prevent others from interfering with their pursuit of happiness. 8 The men
who crafted the Constitution most feared government when it acted as
regulator of private citizens' conduct. 9
Since the framing of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the
federal and state governments have grown into Goliaths that the founding
generation could scarcely have envisioned.20 As federal, state, and local
15. OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27 (1996) (distinguishing the state as a
regulator, which issues and enforces "commands and prohibitions," from the state as an
allocator of government resources, a role which is "of growing importance in the twentieth
century").
16. FEDERALIST No. 51, 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("In framing
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it
to control itself." (emphasis added)).
17. In his description of the early United States, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that
voluntary private associations produced public projects that in other countries had to be
undertaken by government. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 513-17 (J.P.
Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (original English translation
Harper & Row 1966).
18. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 21-22
(1969); Steven J. Heyman, State-Supported Speech, WIS. L. REv. 1119, 1148-49 (1999)
("Classical liberalism assumed, however, that so long as the rights of individuals were
secure, they generally were capable of pursuing the good on their own. It was for this reason
that the role of the state was largely limited to protecting private rights.").
19. DeShaney v. Winnebego Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir.
1987), affid, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Heyman, supra note 18, at 1148-49; see JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
290 (1996). At least this is the conventional view of the Supreme Court. See Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-33 (1986); DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195-96.
20. Heyman, supra note 18, at 1142-43. In the period since the Civil War, the functions
of government have expanded far beyond those performed by the classical state. CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 18-24
(1990). In addition to undertaking extensive social and economic regulation, the modem
state provides a wide range of benefits, including public education, welfare payments, job
training, retirement benefits, medical care for the indigent and elderly, subsidies for business
and agriculture, support for the arts, sciences, and humanities, and many others. Id at 18-24
(citing President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the State of the Union
(Jan. 14, 1944), in 13 PUBLIC PAPERS OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 41 (1969)); Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734-39 (1964).
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governments have expanded, so have the resources-money, property, and
employees-at their command. In 1789, government expenditures were
miniscule.2' Today, government expenditures comprise twenty-nine percent
of the gross domestic product.22 Government allocation of resources and
use of property have a much greater impact on the lives of private citizens
-23today than in our nation's formative years.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes illustrated the early judicial reaction
to government wielding its resources in ways that affected citizens'
constitutional rights in a quip found in his short majority opinion for the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford.24 McAuliffe, a police officer, had been discharged for engaging in
political activities during his off-duty hours. He claimed that by
discharging him, the city had infringed upon his right to free speech.
Holmes's reply was succinct and memorable: "A person may have a right
to talk politics, but not to be a police officer."5 In other words, the First
Amendment placed limits on government control over conduct of private
citizens who use their own private resources, but it permitted the
government to decide who it will employ and how it will use public money
and property. Indeed, as Holmes further observed: "There are a few
employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend the
constitutional right of free speech as well as [the constitutional right] of
idleness by the implied terms of his contract."
26
The obvious problem with Holmes's approach quickly manifested
itself after government expanded in the first half of the twentieth century.
Once government largesse becomes important to citizens, the government
can subvert constitutional rights by conditioning distribution of that
largesse on citizens relinquishing those rights. For example, if a
government adopts a policy of making unannounced visits to the homes of
21. For example, the federal government's expenditures from 1789-1791 were
approximately $4.27 million. 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
HISTORIcAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 1104 (1976).
22. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET: BUDGET OF THE UNrrED STATES
GOvERNMENT FIsCAL YEAR 2000 2, at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudgetlfy2000/pdfl
guide.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2001).
23. Reich, supra note 20, at 734-39. Reich combined some regulatory and proprietary
functions. He discussed licensing as well as government grants and employment. Licensing
is regulatory (at least in most instances-the licensing of drivers perhaps constituting an
exception), because the government is limiting private citizens' ability to exercise dominion
over their own resources.
24. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
25. Id. at517.
26. Id. at 517-18; see CASS R. SUNSTEiN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 294-97 (1993)
[hereinafter THE PARTIAL CoNsTITTIoN].
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public assistance recipients to verify their continued eligibility for the
program, those recipients' Fourth Amendment rights become
27
meaningless. Aid recipients can protect their rights to prevent government
officials from entering their homes without a warrant or probable cause
only at the expense of refusing desperately needed aid. As more and more
people become dependent on various forms of government aid-through
grants-in-aid, government programs, government employment, and the
28like-the pressure placed upon the exercise of rights increases.
The Supreme Court has not crafted a coherent approach for resolving
the issues that arise when government penalizes the exercise of
constitutional rights by the manner in which it distributes its resources.29
The government should have the power to use its resources in ways that
support its objectives. If courts constrained the government's use of public
resources to the same extent that they limit governmental regulatory
authority, government could not operate. At times, the Court allows
government to take actions in its proprietary capacity that it would forbid
the government from taking in its regulatory capacity. 30 For example, the
government can refuse to provide Medicaid funding for indigent women
who use it to pay for abortions, because the government operates in its
proprietary capacity in determining the way public funds can be used, and
can reserve its medical assistance funding for the potential recipients it
27. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971); see S.L. v. Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299
(7th Cir. 1995). See Reich, supra note 20, at 761-62. As the Court explained in Wyman:
We note, too, that the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and that the
beneficiary's denial of permission is not a criminal act. If consent to the visitation
is withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases,
as the case may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no search.
400 U.S. at 317.
28. Reich, supra note 20, at 760-64.
29. Heyman, supra note 18, at 1119 ("No coherent pattern or doctrine emerges from...
decisions [involving state-supported speech]."). After struggling with the issue for nearly
two decades, the Court appears no closer to resolving it. As Justice Blackmum once
remarked, state-supported speech appears to present an "intractable problem." Id at 1120
(quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 205 (1989) (Blackmun J., dissenting)). For a
general discussion of this problem, see Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The
Governmental-Propietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REv. 1973, 1124-
25 (1980).
30. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (noting that "government as
employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign"); U.S. v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656 (1989); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (criminal procedure case
involving government employees); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S.
82 (1984); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (holding that while a state may not prefer its own citizens in
regulating commerce, it may do so when acting as a participant in the market, buying and
selling goods and services itself).
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deems most worthy.31 Government, however, may not prohibit women
from using their own resources to obtain abortions in the first trimester of
pregnancy, because in doing so it acts as a regulator, and thus infringes
37
upon women's privacy rights as established in Roe v. Wade.
Conversely, on some occasions, the Court invokes the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, and refuses to accord government
greater power when it is acting in its proprietary capacity.33 The Court
asserts that government cannot condition provision of a benefit on
recipients' agreements to refrain from exercising their constitutional rights.
For example, a state may terminate an untenured college professor, but it
may not do so because of a disagreement with her political statements.34 At
other times, to put it simply, the Court is confused and fractured. The
question of public libraries' use of filters falls squarely in the middle of this
jurisprudential quagmire, in which the courts struggle with the question of
the Bill of Rights's application to governments' proprietary activities.
It is clear, especially after the Supreme Court's invalidation of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 5 in Reno v. ACLU,36 that the
government can rarely prohibit private parties from posting material on the
Internet or prevent private individuals from accessing the Internet using
their own computers. The First Amendment's commitment to
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate prohibits the government from
restricting communications between private parties on the Internet.
Public libraries, however, do not regulate private individuals' use of
their own resources, as Congress had attempted to do in the
Communications Decency Act. Rather, public libraries control government
resources, such as books purchased with government money and, more
31. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
32. 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
33. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEIucAN CoNsTnTONAL LAW 680-82, 686, 871-84, 969-
70 n.1018 (2d ed. 1988); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARv. L. REv. 84, 102-04 (1998); Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989). See also THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra
note 26, at 291-301.
34. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("For at least a quarter-century, this
Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of
reasons... [the Government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech."); Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,283-84 (1977).
35. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133.
36. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
37. Id. at 884.
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importantly, government-owned computer terminals that allow users to
access the Internet. A private individual could exert dominion over his own
computer terminal by placing a filter on that terminal. Indeed, in Reno v.
ACLU, the Court suggested just such a course of action to parents
concerned about sexually explicit material on the Internet." The
constitutional argument against the use of filters in public libraries may
appear weak; government is entitled, like any other property owner, to
control use of its own property. As Justice Holmes might say, a person may
have a right to see dirty photos, but he has no right to access them from a
government computer.
B. Forum Analysis
To address the use of government property by citizens exercising their
free speech rights, the Supreme Court has developed distinctions among
types of government property, categorizing them as either traditional
public, limited public, or non-public fora.39 Traditional public fora are
government properties that have been dedicated to speech "by long
tradition or by government fiat.' '4 Streets and parks provide the prime
examples of such public fora. 4' Thus, though the government owns streets
and parks, and can therefore legitimately claim that it acts in a proprietary
capacity when restricting access to such public property, the courts have
held that government must allow the full range of speech protected by the
First Amendment in those arenas.42 The Court seems to rely heavily on the
history of a site's openness to the public in determining whether that site
qualifies as a public forum.43
The Court essentially requires the government to relinquish its
38. Id. at 855.
39. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); CASS SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 101 [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OFFREE SPEECH]; TRIBE, supra note 33, at § 12-14, 986-87.
40. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677; DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 39, at 101; TRIBE, supra note 33, at § 12-14,
986-87.
41. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 303 (1974); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring).
42. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
43. See Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992).
Such focus on historical analysis is not unique to public forum jurisprudence. In
determining whether judicial proceedings should be open to the public, one of the two major
factors is the history of openness regarding such proceedings. See Press-Enter. Co. v.
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1986); Bernard W. Bell, Secrets and Lies: News Media
and Law Enforcement Use of Deception as an Investigative Tool, 60 U. Prrr. L. REv. 745,
766 nn.92-94 (1999).
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prerogatives as proprietor, derived from its ownership of property, and
limits it to regulating speech as if the speaker using the government-owned
property were not using government resources at all.44 It is hardly
surprising, then, that few government properties exclusively devoted to
communications qualify as traditional public fora. Often, traditional public
fora are uniquely suited to provide a means of communication to the
general public. These public fora are in some sense monopolies-most
speakers have few alternative means to reach a large audience. Few
effective, low-cost alternatives to public demonstrations or public leafleting
in streets and parks are available to those who seek to reach a mass
audience.4 " The need for effective, low-cost communication explains some
states' expansion of public forum doctrine to privately owned property.
Thus, for instance, some courts, such as the New Jersey Supreme Court,
have accepted the argument that their states' constitutions require private
shopping centers to allow leafleting in their facilities.46 One major rationale
underlying such decisions can be captured by paraphrasing the popular, but
apocryphal quip commonly attributed to bank robber Willie Sutton. When
asked why he robbed banks, Sutton allegedly responded, because "that's
where the money is.''47 Shopping centers must allow communication
44. To use a telecommunications analogy, in such situations the government becomes a
"common carrier" that controls the conditions for access to the medium, but not the content
communicated in the medium, much like telephone companies, who own the means of
telephony but are barred from editing content communicated by telephone. The content of
the phone communications, like the content of communication that occurs in a public forum,
is determined by the non-owners who use the phone lines or the forum.
45. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943); TRIBE, supra note 33, at 987 ('The
'public forum' doctrine holds that restrictions on speech should be subject to higher scrutiny
when ... that speech occurs in areas playing a vital role in communication... especially
because of how indispensable communication in this places is to people who lack access to
more elaborate (and more costly) channels."); see Lee Rudy, Note, A Procedural Approach
to Limited Public Forum Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1255, 1286 (195). Courts often
mention in their analysis that alternative means of expression exist. Kreimer v. Bureau of
Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1262, 1264 (1992); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Free Speech Forum: Forbes
and Finley and Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IowA L. REv. 953, 983 (1998).
46. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757, 777-80 (1994); Lloyd Corp v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 580-81 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), quoted in New Jersey Coalition, 650 A.2d at 778 ('The only hope that these
people have to be able to communicate effectively is to be permitted to speak in those areas
in which most of their fellow citizens can be found. One such area is the business district of
a city or town or its functional equivalent. And this is why respondents have a tremendous
need to express themselves within Lloyds Center.").
47. Willie Sutton, Famous Cases, at http:llwww.fbi.gov/yourfbilhistory/famcases/
sutton/sutton.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2001); Steven Cocheo, The Bank Robber, the Quote,
and the Final Irony, available at http://www.banidng.com/aba/profile..0397.htm (last visited
Feb. 1, 2001).
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481because that's where the people are. In New Jersey Coalition Against War
in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty p.,49 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that "where private ownership of property that is the functional
counterpart of the downtown business district has effectively monopolized
significant opportunities for free speech, the owners cannot eradicate those
opportunities by prohibiting it."5
Limited public fora (sometimes referred to as "designated public
fora") are government-owned properties reserved for a limited set of
communicative purposes. Thus, unlike traditional public fora, the
government may, in its discretion, close the forum. Government agency
inter-office mail and public museums are examples of such fora.5
Designated public fora may be limited to discussion of particular subjects
or use by designated groups. While the courts will scrutinize content-based
limitations, "[t]he necessities of confining a forum to the limited and
legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in
reserving it for.., the discussion of certain topics."53
For instance, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia, the Supreme Court suggested that a university could fund student
publications but exclude from the subsidy program any publication thataddrsse th subect . . 54
addressed the subject of religion. Though the government may define the
48. Of course, the existence of a monopoly does not characterize designated public fora.
49. 650 A.2d 757 (1994).
50. Id. at 777. The Court also quoted approvingly Justice Marshall's statement that:
[T]he owner of the modem shopping center complex, by dedicating his property
to public use as a business district, to some extent displaces the "State" from
control of historical First Amendment forums, and may acquire a virtual
monopoly of places suitable for effective communication. The roadways, parking
lots, and walkways of the modem shopping center may be as essential for
effective speech as the streets and sidewalks in the municipal or company-owned
town.
Id. (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 539-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
51. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
52. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
53. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); see
also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 818 (1985) (citation
omitted) ("Restrictions based on the subject matter of the speech, for example, will almost
never be justified in a public forum such as a park, but will more often be justified as
necessary to reserve the limited public forum to expressive activity compatible with the
property."); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7; City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v.
Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-76 (1976); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974); Travis v. Owego, 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir.
1991); Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1986).
54. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. The Court did not suggest how one might administer
such an exclusion. It determined that the University of Virginia had acted impermissibly
because it had engaged in viewpoint discrimination against religiously based views on
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subject matter to be discussed in the forum, courts will scrutinize the
government's substantive description of the forum's scope. The court will
review exclusions from the forum to ensure that the government applies its
definition to the forum consistently.- It is not clear, however, whether a
limited public forum may exclude a category of speech, such as
commercial speech, merely because the category of speech enjoys
• * • 56
diminished constitutional protection.
Non-public fora are government properties dedicated to non-
communicative uses, such as prisons and military bases, where government
can exclude all rallies, marches, leafleting, and the like.57 Government must
be free to reserve the property for the non-communicative uses that the
property has been designated to serve. This is true even though the setting
may provide uniquely effective means for reaching some segment of the
public.5
8
Recently, even government fora dedicated to some communicative
activities have been classified as non-public fora where the government has
not affirmatively opened up the fora to general participation. For example,
in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,59 the Court
found that the Combined Federal Campaign, a program that allows federal
employees to make charitable contributions to select, listed organizations,
constituted a non-public forum. The Court explained that even though the
secular matters. IM. at 835-36.
55. "Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not
'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum."' Id. at 829 (quoting Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 804-06).
56. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). There, the City
of Cincinnati allowed newsracks, but limited the content of such newsracks to newspapers,
prohibiting commercial handbills. The city had concluded that newsracks created aesthetic
problems and that it would at least ameliorate the problem somewhat by prohibiting
newsracks containing speech entitled to diminished constitutional protection. The Court
rejected that approach. The Court did not focus on public forum analysis, so it did not
clearly indicate whether it viewed potential newsrack locations on public sidewalks as
traditional public fora or limited public fora. Of course, one implication of the Court's
apparent view that it did not need to address this question is that the city's approach would
have been inappropriate regardless of whether the sidewalks were a traditional or limited
public forum. See also 1LA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384-90 (1992) (requirement
of content-neutrality applies, in somewhat modified form, even to laws that prohibit some,
but not all, constitutionally unprotected speech).
57. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998); Perry
Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 47; DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note
39, at 101-02.
58. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). The Court has noted, however, that a
non-public forum will rarely provide the only means of reaching a particular audience.
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
59. 473 U.S. 788.
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federal government facilitated communication by some private groups, it
did so by specific invitation rather than a general invitation to all interested
601parties.
In none of the three types of fora-public, limited, and non-public-
can government engage in viewpoint discrimination.6 ' That is, the
government cannot limit speech on the basis of the viewpoint expressed.
For example, the government cannot allow Republicans to speak, but not
Democrats, or allow expression of pro-choice views on abortion, but not
pro-life views.
This tripartite forum analysis has been subjected to cogent scholarly
criticisms; 62 nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not abandoned it.
Accordingly, courts and commentators have used the Court's tripartite
analysis to review public libraries' powers to prevent their patrons from
accessing certain Internet sites. The major case addressing the issue of a
public library's use of filtering software, Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of
Trustees,63 relied upon just such an approach. Loudoun arose out of the
Loudoun Public Library's Board of Directors's order that the library staff
install filters on all of the library's computers so as to preclude patrons
from accessing sexually explicit Web sites. The District Judge categorized
public libraries as limited public fora, citing the Third Circuit opinion,
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police,64 involving a patron's right to enter a public
library despite his habitually offensive body odor.6' The Loudoun court,
asserting that government could not make content distinctions in designated
public fora, prohibited the library from using filtering software. The
Loudoun court did not, however, address the government's ability to limit
the subject matter of a designated public forum.
Public forum doctrine might ultimately prove useful in analyzing
public libraries' powers to employ filtering software on their computers,
but the doctrine cannot be applied to public libraries in the conventional
way. Conventional forum analysis focuses on the interests of the speakers.
66
60. Id. at 804-05.
61. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993);
see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835-36 (1995);
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811; DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 39,
at 102.
62. E.g., Schauer, supra note 33, at 98-100. An analysis of those criticisms is beyond
the scope of this Article.
63. 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998), summary judgment granted by 24 F. Supp. 2d
552 (1998) ["Loudoun If"].
64. 958 F.2d 1242 (1992).
65. Id.; but see AFSCME Local 2477 v. Billington, 740 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990)
(holding that the Library of Congress is not a public forum).
66. Indeed, Burt Neuborne has explained that free speech law has generally been
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Groups that wish to disseminate their views to their fellow citizens need
parks, streets, and the like to reach the general public at modest CoSt.67 The
audience for such demonstrations, on the other hand, might just as soon
68
wish to use parks and streets undisturbed. Indeed, law enforcement
officials have a constitutional obligation to protect a speaker from a hostile
crowd, even if the officers could keep the peace with substantially less
effort and risk by preventing the speaker from continuing.69 Virtually every
Supreme Court public forum case has been brought by speakers, not those
who seek to receive ideas. Even cases in which the Supreme Court has
ultimately characterized the government property as a designated public
forum or a non-public forum have been initiated by speakers, and the
Court's analysis has focused on the speakers' interests.
Public libraries, however, do not primarily exist to assist those who
wish to express their ideas; rather, public libraries have been established toS 70
facilitate citizens' access to ideas. The person most harmed when a library
bans a book is not the author of the book, but the library patron who wishes
to read it. Thus, any complaint by a Web site owner that his interests have
been harmed because library blockage of his Web site prevented him from
communicating with patrons presents a fairly weak First Amendment
claim. The Web site owner's claim is surely much less substantial than a
patron's claim that her attempt to access the site has been frustrated.
speaker-centered rather than listener-centered until relatively recently. Burt Neuborne, The
First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 5
(1989).
67. Rudy, supra note 45, at 1286.
68. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (observing that the Framers "knew
that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to
encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to
triumph over slothful ignorance"). As Laurence Tribe has said in his treatise: "Outside the
home, the burden is generally on the observer or listener to avert his eyes... [from the]
'offensive' intrusions which increasingly attend urban life." TRIBE, supra note 33, at 948;
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211, 212 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15,21 (1971).
69. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) ("We are well aware that the
ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a
speaker."); see also Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992)
(holding that a city may not charge a fee for police protection that varies depending on the
content of speech).
70. Arthur W. Hafner & Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Democratic Ideals and the American
Public Library 18, in DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC LIBRARY (Arthur W. Hafner ed., 1993)
("The public library is the only agency in American society that makes knowledge, ideas,
and information freely available to all citizens."); AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, AM. LIBRARY AWS'N
POLICY MANuAL 53.1, available at http://www.ala.orgalaorg/policymanual/ (last modified
Nov. 23, 1999); Council for the Am. Library Ass'n, Libraries: An American Value (1999)
(statement adopted on Feb. 3, 1999), at http://www.ala.orglalaorg/oif/liv.val.html (last
modified Oct. 10, 2000).
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For example, patrons of the Loudoun Public Library had a much
stronger First Amendment claim against the library for using blocking
software than did the Web site owners whose sites were allegedly blocked
by the filters.7' Indeed, the Web site owners' position did not differ
materially from that of the charities complaining of the exclusion from the
Combined Federal Campaign in Cornelius.72 Public libraries, like the
Combined Federal Campaign, are non-public fora, at least from the
speaker's perspective. Librarians should be free to provide the content they
believe is in the best interest of their patrons without the constraint of
considering the interests of the creators of expressive materials.
The somewhat odd nature of the analysis in both Kreimer and
AFSCME Local 2477 v. Billington,73 a second case involving a patron's
claim of a right of access to a government library, stems from the failure to
recognize that claims of people seeking information might differ from
those of speakers, and thus might require a different analysis. In Kreimer,
the court noted that the public library was the quintessential locus for the
exercise of the right to receive information, suggesting a presumption that
public libraries should qualify as traditional public fora.74 The court then
retreated, deciding that the public library could not be considered a
traditional public forum because allowing library patrons to engage in
expressive activities, such as addressing their fellow patrons, would disrupt
the library.75 Kreimer, however, did not wish to present a lecture to his
fellow patrons; he merely desired access to the quintessential place to
receive information so that he could read. The question was whether he
could do so given his deleterious hygiene. In AFSCME Local 2477, the
71. Several Web site owners successfully intervened in Loudoun I on the grounds that
their free speech rights had been blocked by the library's decision to use a software filter. 24
F. Supp. 2d 552, 557 (E.D. Va. 1998). The court held that such interveners had standing. Id.
at 557-60. Of course, standing might be appropriate given that perhaps Web site owners are
injured and could invoke the rights of patrons under a third-party standing theory, regardless
of whether they personally have any First Amendment interest that has been infringed.
TRIBE, supra note 33, at 134-45.
72. In Cornelius, inclusion in the Combined Federal Campaign would have aided
plaintiff organizations in obtaining support from federal employees who were interested in
participating in the Campaign. The Court said, however, that the federal government had not
offered a general invitation to organizations to participate in the Campaign. 473 U.S. at 803-
04. The Court also noted that employee preferences about participating in a campaign that
encompassed political organizations justified the government's selection of the
organizations to participate in the program. Although being accessible from a public
library's computer would help Web site owners communicate with willing Internet users,
the government need not offer a general invitation to all Web site owners and should be able
to give primary consideration to the interests and preferences of users.
73. 740 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990).
74. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1256 (1992).
75. Id.
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court appeared to conclude that the Library of Congress was a non-public
forum because it was not open for expressive activity.76 Again, this
conclusion would make sense if a patron wanted to use the library to give a
speech or distribute leaflets. If, however, a patron merely desires access to
obtain information, the sounder conclusion would be that the public library
is at least a limited public forum (and perhaps even a traditional public
forum for receiving information).
We must at least consider whether the tripartite analysis the Court has
employed when the concerns of speakers predominate remains appropriate
when the needs of audiences assume paramount importance. The Supreme
Court has recognized a citizen's interest in receiving ideas as a right
protected by the First Amendment7 7 but only in a few relatively unusual
cases, and often merely as a corollary to the rights of speakers. 79 As the
Court has said on occasion, "The dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider
them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
buyers."80 This has led to the view that if no potential speaker has a First
Amendment right, then no potential listener can have a corresponding First
Amendment right. Justice Powell's dissent in Board of Education v. Pico81
exemplifies this view. In Pico, the Court faced the question of whether a
public secondary school violated its students' rights when it removed
certain books from the school library. Justice Powell argued that student
patrons of school libraries could have no First Amendment right to prevent
school authorities from removing library books, because authors and
publishers had no corresponding First Amendment right to demand that
books remain on school library shelves.82
76. AFSCME Local 2477, 740 F. Supp. at 7 (dismissing the argument that rooms of the
Library of Congress were a public forum).
77. TRME, supra note 33, at 944-55; Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65
(1972).
78. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (commercial speech); Kleindeinst, 408 U.S. 753 (upholding denial of visa for
communist speaker). See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (reversal of conviction of
defendant for possessing pornographic material inside his home); Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
79. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 944 ("A right to know at times means nothing more than a
mirror of such a right to speak, a listener's right that government not interfere with a willing
speaker's liberty."); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of
Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1, 8 (1976) (arguing that a right to know is never more than a
right to have government not interfere with a willing speaker's liberty).
80. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32 n.22 (1978).
81. 457 U.S. 853.
82. IeL at 912.
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There is a place, however, for a focus on citizens as listeners as well
as speakers. As James Madison eloquently observed, and the Court has
sometimes acknowledged: "A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both." 3 Indeed, on occasion, speakers and listeners
might have somewhat incongruent interests. With regard to regulation of
the electromagnetic spectrum, for example, the Supreme Court has
recognized the potential conflict between listeners and speakers, and
declared the listener's interests paramount. The Court has thus allowed the
federal government to create and enforce obligations on broadcasters that
subordinate speakers' customary power to decide the content of their
speech to the public's broader need for "suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences. 84 Such conflicts between
speakers and listeners are particularly likely to arise when there is more
than one speaker involved in the communication, as in the library and
broadcast situations. In such scenarios, a secondary speaker (like a library)
selects from among a group of primary speakers (like authors) who wish to
communicate with the secondary speaker's audience.
Thus, using conventional public forum analysis in the library setting
presents difficulty; a "listener" perspective rather than a "speaker"
perspective is required.
C. Prior Restraint
Another First Amendment doctrine that some have utilized in
analyzing the constitutionality of public libraries' use of filtering software
is the prohibition on prior restraints. 85 A legal requirement that speakers
submit their expressive material to a government official for approval
before disseminating the materials to the general public constitutes a prior
restraint. The Defense Department's system for reviewing correspondents'
dispatches from combat zones provides one example of such a system of
prior restraint. Since Near v. Minnesota" was decided in 1931, the courts
83. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (plurality opinion); see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thomas Jefferson even more
succinctly expressed a similar sentiment: "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free ... it
expects what never was and never will be." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Col. Charles
Yancy, Jan. 6, 1816, quoted in Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc.
v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400, 409 (Fla. 1996) (Overton, J., concurring).
84. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
85. Junichi P. Semitsu, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filtering
Software vs. the First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REv. 509, 529-32 (2000); see also Loudoun
II, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 570 (E.D. Va. 1998); Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 797 (E.D. Va.
1998).
86. For a discussion of censorship during military conflict, see TED GALEN CARPENTER,
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have also categorized judicial injunctions as prior restraints. As the
Supreme Court has observed on several occasions, a prior restraint is the
most serious and least tenable infringement on First Amendment rights.8 9
Prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional, ° and, thus, almost never
upheld. Courts have, however, permitted the use of prior restraints to
prohibit the distribution of obscene material, so long as the procedures
established by the government satisfy rigorous criteria.9' In Loudoun, the
court viewed the public library's use of filtering software as a prior
restraint and accordingly found the use of such software unconstitutional
(primarily because the manner in which the library used the filtering
software did not satisfy procedural guidelines that a system of prior
restraints must incorporate to be constitutional).92
Traditionally, the courts have applied the prior restraint doctrine to
governmental regulatory actions. If the doctrine applies to actions
governments take in their proprietary capacities, it applies in a less rigorous
manner. Governments can often further the public good by using their
resources to engage in speech. If governments are either to communicate
with citizens or effectively operate government programs designed
primarily to facilitate private citizens' speech, government must have the
power to consider content in selecting the speech it will fund with public
resources. For example, the government must have the authority to
determine the contents of government reports and publications. Likewise,
the federal government must possess the power to consider content in
deciding which among numerous competing proposals to support with
grants from the National Endowment for the Arts ("NEA"), and local
governments must have the power to consider content in selecting art for
display in public museums.
THE CAPTIVE PRESS: FOREIGN POLICY CRISES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1995).
87. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
88. Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993); New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403
U.S. 713 (1971); Near, 283 U.S. at 723. There has been some discussion about whether
injunctions should be considered prior restraints. John Calvin Jeffries, Rethinking Prior
Restraints, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983).
89. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ('The thread running
through all these cases is that prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serous
and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."); accord Gentile v. State
Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1056 (1991); Bantham Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963);
Near, 283 U.S. 697.
90. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 ("Any system of prior restraints on expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity")
(quoting Bantham Books Inc., 372 U.S. at 70).
91. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
92. Loudoun 1, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 570 (E.D. Va. 1998); Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783,
797 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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The Supreme Court has at most applied an extremely limited version
of its prior restraint doctrine to actions governments take in their
proprietary capacity. Three cases-Alexander v. United States,93 Snepp v.
United States,94 and Gentile v. State Bar95--illustrate the Court's refusal to
apply its conventional prohibitions on prior restraint when the government
acts in its proprietary capacity. In Alexander, the federal government
gained title to a bookstore and its contents pursuant to the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 96 on the grounds that
the owner had repeatedly used the store to sell obscene books in violation
of the applicable obscenity laws. Rather than selling the books to some
third party, the government destroyed the books,97 including some that,
while pornographic, were not obscene, and thus were entitled to First
Amendment protection."
To the majority, the question of whether the Constitution prohibited
the federal government's destruction of books once it had gained title to
them did not even warrant serious discussion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for
the majority, observed off-handedly in a footnote: "Not wishing to go into
the business of selling pornographic materials-regardless of whether they
were legally obscene-the Government decided that it would be better to
destroy the forfeited expressive materials than sell them to members of the
public."99 The majority went on to hold that even the application of the civil
RICO statute to allow forfeiture of protected books because some of the
books were not protected did not qualify as a prior restraint.' °0 The
dissenters primarily expressed concern about the potential impact of such
government use of RICO upon free speech, expounding upon the First
93. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
94. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
95. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
96. Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
68 (1994)).
97. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 548 n.1.
98. Id.
99. Id. This theme was echoed in General Media Comms., Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273,
285 (2d Cir. 1997), as amended at 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 40571 at *36 (2d Cir. Mar. 25,
1998). In General Media, the publishers of Penthouse magazine challenged a federal statute
that prohibited military post exchanges, commonly referred to as PXs, from stocking
sexually explicit materials. The Court, in upholding the Act, explained that the statute was
not overbroad in relation to its purpose because "[t]he problem the Act seeks to address, in
short, is that the military should not be in the business of selling sexually explicit materials,
and the solution embodied in the Act is to forbid the military from doing so." In other
words, as in Alexander, the federal government could refuse to sell sexually explicit books
without having to cite any instrumental value that the ban served-it was sufficient that the
government did not want to sell such material.
100. Alexander, 509 U.S. at 549-55.
[Vol. 53
Number 2] FILTH, FILTERING, FIRSTAMENDMENT
Amendment implication of allowing the government to forfeit an entire
bookstore because the owner knew that some of his inventory was
obscene.10'
Snepp v. United States'°2 also illustrates the prior restraint doctrine's
limited applicability when the government acts as a proprietor controlling
its own resources rather than as a regulator seeking to control private
entities' use of their own money. In Snepp, the Court allowed the Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA") to establish a system of prepublication
review. As a condition of employment, individuals joining the CIA must
sign an agreement requiring them to submit certain manuscripts they have
authored to the CIA for review prior to general publication.' In particular,
any manuscript discussing the author's activities at the CIA required
clearance.'0 5 Not only did the Court uphold the CIA's system of
prepublication review, it even allowed the CIA to enforce the system by
imposing a constructive trust upon any profits earned on works authors had
not submitted for clearance.' 6 Indeed, the Court permitted the CIA to
invoke the constructive trust remedy even though the Agency conceded
that the defendant's book did not reveal any classified information.'0 7
The contrast with the Court's holding nine years earlier in New York
Times Co. v. United States (the 'Pentagon Papers" case)0 8 could hardly be
sharper. The Court refused to enjoin the New York Times and the
Washington Post from publishing leaked classified defense documents,
despite the government's argument that publication of the documents
would substantially damage the United States's interests.' 9 Because the
101. Id. The majority's opinion does seem extreme. When the government acquires
protected materials, the First Amendment has at least some implications for the power of the
government to destroy such materials. Government officials should perhaps lack the power
to simply destroy such expressive materials unless the cost of selling them exceeds the
amount their sale is likely to net or unless there is some other substantial reason to destroy
them. There is no indication that either was the case in Alexander. The majority was
unmoved, although the dissent suggested that the destruction of the books violated the
Constitution. d at 576 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Quite apart from the direct bearing that
our prior restraint cases have on the entire forfeiture that was ordered in this case, the
destruction of books and films that were not obscene and not adjudged to be so is a remedy
with no parallel in our cases.").
102. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
103. Id at513.
104. Id at 508.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 515-16.
107. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. New York Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713,714 (1971).
109. At least two of the Justices who voted to deny the injunction believed that
publication of the classified documents would do substantial damage to the public interest.
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government could not demonstrate the type of immediate and serious harm
resulting from publication of the purloined documents that would justify
imposing a prior restraint, the Court denied the injunction."0 The starkly
contrasting results in Snepp and the Pentagon Papers case reflect the
difference in the government's role in the two cases. In Snepp, the
government acted as a proprietor, exercising its right to impose terms of
employment on its employees. In the Pentagon Papers case, the
government attempted to regulate the conduct of private entities-the New
York Times and the Washington Post.
The constraints that the Supreme Court has allowed the federal and
state judiciaries to impose upon lawyers, when contrasted with the severe
limitations the Court has placed on judicial efforts to control media
reporting about trials, also demonstrate that the prior restraint doctrine
either does not apply to the government in its proprietary capacity, or, at
the very least, applies much less rigorously. In Gentile v. State Bar,"' the
Court upheld restraints on the speech of defense attorneys, allowing the
Nevada Supreme Court to enforce a code of conduct proscribing attorney
speech that "ha[s] a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding."' 2 By contrast, in Nebraska Press Association,"3
the Court prohibited entry of injunctions barring the press from publishing
matters that could prevent fair trials. Indeed, the Court suggested that
limiting the press's power to publish information regarding pending or
potential criminal litigation could rarely be justified." 4 The differences
between the two cases reflect a broader pattern, in which the treatment of
various trial "participants" turns on the capacity in which the government
can exercise control over them. Courts and governmental entities can
impose the fewest restraints on the press, more restraints on defense
attorneys, and even more restraints on prosecutors, law enforcement
officers, and court personnel. Reporters, as private individuals over whom
the government has no authority in its proprietary capacity, generally enjoy
immunity from prior restraints, because the government's regulatory power
to limit truthful speech about crimes and trials is quite limited."
5
Prosecutors, on the other hand, are public officers over whom the
government unquestionably has authority in its proprietary capacity. Thus,
the government can restrict prosecutors' statements regarding pending or
403 U.S. at 731 (White, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
110. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam).
111. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
112. Id. at 1033 (quoting Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177(1)).
113. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
114. Id. at 569-70.
115. Id. at 562-70.
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potential litigation, particularly statements made while on the job.'16
Defense attorneys are subject to an intermediate range of limitations.'
17
They are private citizens, yet at the same time they also have official
responsibilities, a status captured by the term "officer of the court." Thus,
the level of government control corresponds to the extent to which the
government exercises its proprietary rather than regulatory powers."'
Public forum doctrine, however, alters the government's powers as a
proprietor to engage in prepublication review of speech. Though
government can claim that it acts in its proprietary capacity in regulating
public property, the designation of a piece of government property as a
traditional public forum strips the government of its proprietary powers to
control the content of speech in that forum (much as it does with respect to
shopping center owners). Thus, the prior restraint doctrine, which applies
with full force to regulatory actions, limits government exercise of content
controls in public fora. For example, the government may not review the
content of speech or make content determinations before approving permits
for parades and demonstrations." 9 Moreover, the approval process is
permissible only if clear noncommunicative effects of speech will interfere
with the noncommunicative uses of the traditional public forum.
120
Assuming a public library might be characterized as a traditional
public forum, the need to view it as a forum for recipients of information
instead of speakers may have implications for prior restraint analysis. Prior
restraint doctrine would impose restrictions not on the governmental choice
of materials, as it would if it were a speaker forum, but instead on
government review of individuals' interests in obtaining materials. For
116. See Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
117. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074-75; id. at 1081-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("As officers of the
court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public
debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the fair
administration of justice."). Though Gentile itself does not distinguish between defense
attorneys and prosecutors, employee speech cases, like Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,
674 (1994), appear to permit greater restrictions on government employees than the Court
was willing to allow merely because attorneys are officers of the court. Gentile, of course,
also pointed to attorneys' special access to information as a justification for limiting
attorney speech. 501 U.S. at 1057.
118. This raises a particularly difficult question with regard to jurors. Jurors are private
citizens-precisely the reason they have a role in the trial process. On the other hand,
private citizens acting as jurors exercise governmental power and, thus, controls over their
speech might be characterized as deriving from the government's proprietary powers.
119. Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-36 (1992); Cox v.
La., 379 U.S. 536, 553-57 (1965); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); see City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (dealing with newsracks).
120. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. at 762-63.
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instance, considerations similar to those governing prior restraint doctrine
would suggest that libraries may not require users to seek permission on an
individual basis to unblock certain Web sites or establish a system in which
library staff act as monitors empowered to order patrons to desist if they
begin viewing "inappropriate" sites. Many of the harms of censorship
regimes noted in Freedman v. Maryland would exist in such
circumstances. If libraries are fora that primarily function as resources for
individual citizens, such an approach is impermissible.
Thus, courts cannot facilely apply prior restraint doctrine to the issues
raised by public libraries' use of filtering software. Not only does this
difficulty have implications with regard to public libraries' ability to block
access to some Internet sites, it also has an impact on the procedures public
libraries can employ in carrying out their policies, as this Article discusses.
Moreover, to the extent that prior restraint doctrine does apply, an audience
perspective, rather than a speaker perspective, is appropriate.
D. Pico
Board of Education v. Pico,122 perhaps the Supreme Court case most
directly relevant to the constitutionality of public libraries' use of filtering
software, provides a prime illustration of the Court's sometimes fractured
and confused nature when assessing actions governments take in their
proprietary capacity. Pico involved school libraries serving a public high
school and junior high school in a Long Island, New York school district.
At the insistence of school board members, the libraries removed eleven
"dangerous" books from library shelves, including Slaughterhouse Five by
Kurt Vonnegut, Black Boy by Richard Wright, and Soul on Ice by Eldridge
Cleaver. 23 The Board's concern about the books stemmed from three
boardmembers' attendance at a conference sponsored by a politically
conservative organization of parents.12 At the meeting, the members
obtained lists of books deemed "objectionable" or "improper fare for
school students.' ' 25 A few months thereafter, the Board issued an unofficial
directive to remove ten of those books from library shelves and submitthemto e Bord fr " 126
them to the Board for review. When the Superintendent advised the
Board that it had departed from established procedures for considering
whether books should be removed from library shelves, the Board
121. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
122. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
123. Ia at 856 n.3.
124. Id at 856.
125. Id
126. Id at 857.
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persisted. 117 Relenting somewhat at it its next meeting, however, the Board
appointed an advisory panel to read all of the books and determine their
121
suitability for high school students. When the advisory committee
concluded that many of the books should be retained, the Board
disregarded the committee's determination and ordered permanent
restrictions placed on all but one of the books.129 The Supreme Court failed
to produce a majority opinion, and thus the case produced no holding that
serves as binding precedent. Worse still, the case resulted in six separate
opinions. The three-Justice plurality, acknowledging school authorities'
power to remove books on grounds of "educational suitability," held that
educational authorities could not remove books from school libraries
merely because those books offended authorities' views of "what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.''.
The fact that the school was operating in its proprietary capacity when it
removed the books did not exempt it from First Amendment constraints,
but educators were nonetheless afforded substantial discretion based on
their educational judgment. 1 2 The plurality pointedly expressed concern
that elected officials, not professional educators, had made the decision to
remove the books.'33
The four dissenters took up the mantra of Justice Holmes circa 1892,
arguing that the First Amendment simply did not constrain educators'
decisions about how they would use a school's resources, including its
books. 13 4 They noted that students could gain access to such books by other
means-ironically mentioning public libraries as one source for such
books.'35
The parallel between removing library books and installing filtering
127. IdM at 857 n.4.
128. Id at 857.
129. Id at 858.
130. The Court did do better than the Second Circuit, however, where a panel of three
judges produced three different opinions. Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980).
131. Pico, 457 U.S. at 871-72.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 874 (observing that "[t]his would be a very different case if the record
demonstrated that petitioners had employed established, regular, and facially unbiased
procedures for the review of controversial materials" and concluding that exactly the
opposite was true because "petitioners ignored 'the advice of literary experts,' ... librarians
and teachers .... the Superintendent of Schools, and the guidance of publications that rate
books for junior and senior high school students") (internal citations omitted); Schauer,
supra note 33, at 115 ("Consideration of the role of library professionals in the selection and
de-selection processes might explain the source of the First Amendment worry that the
Court noted, but left unresolved, in Board of Education v. Pico.").
134. Pico, 457 U.S. at 889 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 892.
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systems on library computers is obvious. When a library secures Internet
access, it gains access to all Internet sites. A filter removes some of the
Web sites to which the library has a right of access. 1 6 In effect, the library
has acquired a set of materials and then refused to make some of those
materials available to its patrons. 1
37
Moreover, the role of the public library differs from that of the school
library in ways that make the former's filtering decision more difficult to
justify. First, as every Supreme Court Justice recognized in Pico, primary
and secondary schools exist, in part, to instill certain values in children.
Fulfilling that function requires educators' discretionary selections of
content with respect to books in the school library as well as with respect to
curriculum."' Public libraries do not seek to inculcate values in the same
139
way.
Second, children form the dominant part of the audience in the school
library setting at issue in Pico, while patrons of public libraries include
large numbers of adults as well as children. Government may undoubtedly
take actions to shield children from sexually explicit material, even though
it may not seek to shield adults from the same material. Indeed, where
audiences include both children and adults, courts allow government to
restrict speech in ways that would ordinarily be prohibited if the speech
only reached adults. 14 Certainly, some of the justifications for public
library use of filtering software relate to protecting children from sexually
explicit and other forms of speech that may harm a child's emotional and
136. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) ("[T]he State may not,
consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available
knowledge.").
137. Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech?: CDA 2.0 v. Filtering, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 629, 657 (1998) ("My sense is that using software to block sites may seem
more like the removal of books, rather than a choice not to subscribe."); Brigette L. Nowak,
Note, The First Amendment Implications of Placing Blocking Software on Public Library
Computers, 45 WAYNE L. REv. 327, 350, 354 (1999); see Julia M. Tedjeske, Note,
Mainstream Loudoun and Access to Internet Resources in Public Libraries, 60 U. PITr. L.
REv. 1265, 1284 (1999).
138. Pico, 457 U.S. at 869-70. The Court also discussed this "socialization" function of
the schools in Amback v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78 n.8, 80 (1979) (upholding state statute
prohibiting noncitizens from being teachers). In Amback, the Court said, "[A] State properly
may regard all teachers as having an obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding
in their classes, regardless of the subject taught." Id. at 80. In many ways, the dispute among
the Justices in Pico centered on whether school libraries have only this inculcation mission.
Compare Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion), with id. at 914-15
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, supra note 70, [ 53.1.4 (only parents should decide which
library material is available to their children). Compare paragraph 53.1.4 with the preceding
paragraph of the Policy Manual that addresses school libraries. Id. 53.1.
140. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-51 (1978).
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psychological development. 141 The problem of shielding children from
inappropriate sexual material, however, could be solved at least in larger
public libraries by designating separate terminals for children and adults.
142
Libraries could employ other methods to effect such a separation. 43 If
separation is possible, maintaining filters on terminals accessible only to
adults could not be justified by the potential effects of the unfiltered
terminals on children. 44 Government may not restrict adults to the level of
reading material fit for children.' 45
The response to this argument might be that librarians have always
had to decide which materials would be available to readers. Moreover,
while the Internet still requires librarians to fill that role, it has only
substituted one form of scarcity-limited acquisition budgets and spatial
constraints-for another form that is no less real-time at the available
computers. That is, if libraries do not have terminals to satisfy the demands
of all who want to use them, librarians will have to find some way to ration
available computer time. Thus, arguably, librarians retain the authority to
decide which inquiries are most worthwhile in order to prioritize the use of
scarce computer time.1
46
IH. PUBLIC LIBRARIES: A NEW TYPE OF FORUM
A. Dual Roles of Government-Supported Speech
Government may act as a conventional speaker, attempting to
communicate a particular message in order to further a government
141. Special limitations on speech can be established to protect children. The
government's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors
is "compelling" and may serve as a justification for limiting constitutionally protected
speech. U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 881 (2000) (cable scrambling); Sable
Comms. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("We have recognized that there is a compelling
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors."); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 757-58 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
142. Santiago, supra note 12, at 278; Loudoun 17, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552, 567; Warren,
supra note 13, at 55.
143. Mem. from Jenner & Block to the Am. Library Ass'n 11-12 (Feb. 4, 2000),
available at http://www.ftrf.orglintemetfilteringmemo.html (discussing the use of smart
cards, which contain patron-specific information that automatically imposes a particular
level of filtering on that patron's Internet access).
144. See Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. at 881; Sable Comms., 492 U.S. at 126-28;
Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1968); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380 (1957); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983); see
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 758 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (importance of ability to limit
speech reaching children "without also limiting willing adults' access to it").
145. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
146. Nadel, supra note 11, at 1128.
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program. The communication could provide largely factual information,
such as safety statistics regarding the airlines, 47 or could state an opinion,
for example, that visitors to national parks should not feed bears or that
citizens should conserve energy. 141 Sometimes, however, the government
funds expressive activity not to communicate its own message, but to
encourage citizens' self-expression. Programs such as the NEA provide
examples of the latter type of government program. Courts have recognized
this distinction in at least two contexts.
The Supreme Court has distinguished government as speaker from
government as facilitator in considering governments' powers to make
content judgments in allocating funding for expressive activities. In
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court
noted that when the government seeks to communicate its own message by
funding private speakers, it may impose content-based limits on the private
speech with government money and may make content-based distinctions
in deciding which private speakers to fund. 149 In other words, "when the
government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its
own it is entitled to say what it wishes."' 50 The Court referred to its ruling
in Rust v. Sullivan.15 ' The program at issue in Rust, the Court observed,
provided an example of government use of private speakers to convey the
government's message. The Rosenberger majority explained that the Court
had upheld the regulation at issue in Rust v. Sullivan, prohibiting doctors
from discussing the option of abortion, because that regulation was part of
a government effort to communicate its own message. 152 The government
was not seeking to facilitate the speech of medical personnel. The means
the government chooses to deliver its own message should not, said the
Court, limit the government's control over its message.153 When
government "expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers," however, courts prohibit viewpoint discrimination and closely
scrutinize other content-based limitations on speech.
154
147. Ralph Vartabedian & Edwin Chen, FAA to Provide Safety Reports on the Internet,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1997, at Al.
148. Lars Noah, Administration Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional
Delegations of Authority, 1997 Wis. L. Rnv. 873, 890-91 (discussing agency use of adverse
publicity as a regulatory tool); Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative
Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380 (1973).
149. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
150. Id. at 833 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
151. Id. at 833; see Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 612 (1998);
Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
152. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
153. Id.; see Finley, 524 U.S. at 612; Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
154. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. The plurality in Pico relied on an analogous
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The distinction between speaking and facilitating others' speech has a
much longer tradition in the defamation area.155 Courts have traditionally
distinguished publishers from distributors in setting standards for
defamation liability.156 Publishers communicate their own ideas and can be
held liable for the defamatory nature of their assertions, even if they have
merely repeated others' defamatory statements. Distributors, such as
bookstores, newsstands, and libraries, serve a very different function. They
make the expressive materials of others available to the broader public.
Moreover, given their role as a conduit connecting publishers to readers,
entities like bookstores, newsstands, and libraries cannot reasonably be
expected to ensure that a publication is not defamatory before they offer it
to the public. 157 Thus, courts have recognized that distributors deserve
greater protection from liability for defamation.5 8 Indeed, Congress has by
statute accorded online service providers complete immunity from liability
distinction to differentiate classroom curriculum, over which educational officials could
exercise plenary content control, and school libraries, where such content-based
determinations should be more closely reviewed. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869
(1982) (stating that special characteristics of the school library make the environment
especially appropriate for the First Amendment rights of students, because the library,
unlike the school classroom, is a place for voluntary inquiry and study).
155. The distinction also has a long history in the regulation of telecommunications.
Telephone companies have long been regulated as common carriers that serve as mere
conduits for the subscribers' messages. They own the means of communication but can
exercise essentially no control over its content. In contrast, broadcasters are regulated as
"public trustees" who primarily communicate their own messages or the messages of others
selected at their discretion, but operate under some constraints with regard to content. See
Jerome A. Barron, The Telco, the Common Carrier Model and the First Amendment-The
"Dial-A-Porn" Precedent, 19 RuTrGERs COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371, 381-85 (1993).
156. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 581; 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON
DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 7.3.1 (3d ed. 2000).
157. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at
810-12 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 581, 612; SACK,
supra note 156, § 7.3.1. Indeed, the Supreme Court announced just such an approach with
regard to obscenity when it overturned an ordinance that criminalized the sale of obscene
books regardless of the lack of scienter of the bookseller. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1960). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained:
[I]f the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents... he
will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected . . . "Every
bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of the
contents of every book in his shop. It would be altogether unreasonable to demand
so near an approach to omniscience." And the bookseller's burden would become
the public's burden, for by restricting him the public's access to reading matter
would be restricted. If the contents of bookshops and periodical stands were
restricted to material of which the proprietors had made an inspection, they might
be depleted indeed.
Id. at 153 (internal citation omitted).
158. KEETONETAL., supra note 157, § 113, at 810-11.
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for materials posted by others on their systems. 59 Such online service
providers are a new type of distributor. This distinction between
government as speaker and government as facilitator can assist the analysis
of the status of public libraries.
B. Public Libraries' Roles and Traditions
By establishing and maintaining public libraries, the government acts
as a facilitator of patrons in obtaining access to speech, not as a speaker
seeking to communicate its speech to library patrons. Courts should view
public libraries as places for wide-ranging inquiry that should make
available to the public the widest possible array of knowledge'6 Public
libraries are the archetypal institutions where citizens can accessS 161
information on the range of human endeavors. Indeed, this has long been
the mission of public libraries. The first libraries in the colonies that would
later become the United States were not public libraries in the sense of
being funded by the government, but were subscription libraries that served
as facilitators. In 1731, Benjamin Franklin founded the first subscription
library in the colonies, and, as he noted in his autobiography, this library:
was the mother of all the North American subscription libraries, now
so numerous. It is become a great thing itself, and continually
increasing. These libraries have improved the general conversation of
the Americans, made the most common tradesmen and farmers as
intelligent as most gentlemen from other countries, and perhaps have
contributed in some degree to the stand so generally made throughout
the colonies in defense of their privileges.162
Given the public library's role as facilitator rather than channel for
government speech, the government should not have the plenary control
over the material it makes available to patrons of a public library in the
same way that it may control fora in which the government seeks to
communicate its own message. In some ways, libraries are analogous to
159. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. IV 1998); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th
Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). A similar approach has
been adopted with regard to defamation of cable system public access channels. By
statute-the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992-
franchising authorities are immune from liability for the defamatory nature of broadcasts on
public access channels. Caprotti v. Town of Woodstock, 681 N.Y.S.2d 911 (3d Dep't 1998)
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 555(a) (1994)).
160. AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, supra note 70, 53.1.
161. Hafner & Sterling-Folker, supra note 70, at 18; AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, supra note 70,
53.1.
162. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AuTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRA'KLIN (1793),
available at http://earlyamerica.com/lives/franklin/chapt7/text.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2001). Public libraries in their modem form started in the mid-1800s and developed from a
wide variety of privately run libraries and collections.
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universities as loci for wide-ranging, free inquiry.13 More generally, the
role of libraries for listeners may be analogized to the role of streets and
parks for speakers. Libraries are the archetypal traditional government-
funded loci for acquiring knowledge, just as streets and parks are by
tradition archetypal government-funded loci for speaking.164 If public
libraries should be viewed as settings for wide-ranging inquiry, the First
Amendment should greatly restrain public libraries from blocking the
availability of Internet sites.
The recognition that public libraries have a constitutional obligation
to provide a forum for wide-ranging inquiry should not, however, mean
that librarians can exercise no discretion when making public resources
available. If the only permissible basis for imposing restrictions were
instrumentalist-reasons related to the harm that unrestricted access would
cause-libraries could advance few persuasive justifications for installing
blocking software on all Internet terminals. Several instrumentalist reasons
can be envisioned, including: (1) protecting children from inappropriate
materials; (2) preventing offense to other patrons and library staff; (3)
163. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) ("In
the University setting ... the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and
experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition[.]"); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) ("[W]e have recognized that the university is a
traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the
Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached
to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and over breadth
doctrines of the First Amendment[.]"); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985) ("[A] university campus, at least as to its students, possesses
many of the characteristics of a traditional public forum."); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (university or public libraries are "designed for
freewheeling inquiry"); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957)).
164. Granted, libraries, unlike traditional public fora, might not be uniquely suited to
communication between speakers and the general public. If examined from the speakers'
point of view, the argument that public libraries are a critical channel of communication, in
general, or one with respect to material on the Internet in particular, clearly lacks merit.
Most Internet access takes place outside of public libraries. At most, a small segment of a
Web site's audience will access the site from libraries rather than from home or work. Even
when examined from the perspective of library users-the more appropriate perspective-
the argument as to the library's uniqueness still fails. Many individuals have access to the
Internet at work, at home, or at both locations. C. RICHARD NEu ET AL., SENDING YOUR
GOVERNMENT A MESSAGE: E-MAIL COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CITIZENS AND GOVERNMENT
119-48 (1999). Thus, for most people, being blocked from a site in the public library does
not mean that the site becomes inaccessible. Large elements of society, however, do not
have access to the Internet for recreational use outside the library. Id. Presumably, many
people who seek to access the Internet in public libraries do not have access at home.
Nevertheless, the argument that public libraries play a central role in communications in the
same way that streets and parks do seems strained.
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precluding harmful secondary effects; and (4) enabling patrons to use the
Internet more efficiently.
As noted earlier, a library's interest in protecting children from
exposure to inappropriate materials probably provides the most compelling
instrumentalist justification for employing filters in a manner that blocks
children's access to sexually explicit sites. If the library can restrict
children's access to sexually explicit Internet sites while allowing adults
unfiltered access, however, the interest in protecting children cannot justify
installation of filters that limit every patron's access to sexually explicit
Internet sites.
1 66
A second instrumentalist argument contends that filters can prevent
Internet users from exposing library staff and other patrons to offensive
materials. Patrons may observe the content of a nearby computer screen
and may find that content offensive. Library officials could arrange the
physical layout of the library and placement of computers so that the
computer screens are not visible to other patrons. Alternatively, libraries
could install privacy screens, which preclude everyone but the user from
seeing a computer screen. 67 Such efforts probably constitute an adequate
response to the concern about patrons' unwanted exposure to images being
viewed by their fellow patrons. 1"
Library employees' concern about unwanted exposure to sexually
explicit Web sites might, in some ways, present a more difficult problem. A
patron using the Internet might seek the assistance of a librarian, and the
librarian, in rendering such assistance, might have to view a screen that
contains offensive, sexually explicit material. The patron who requests
assistance might or might not intend to cause the librarian offense.
Ultimately, however, even the library staff problem does not justify
installing filters on library computers. First, any patron who places a
sexually explicit image on the screen that would offend most people and
then calls a librarian over to assist him for the purpose of offending the
165. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
167. Warren, supra note 13, at 55.
168. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (ordinance limiting
showing of sexually explicit scenes at drive-in theaters held unconstitutional because the
"ordinance seeks only to keep these films from being seen from public streets and places
where the offended viewer readily can avert his eyes."); see also Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21 (1971); TRIBE, supra note 33, at 948 ("Outside the home, the burden is generally
on the observer or listener to avert his eyes or plug his ears against the verbal assaults, lurid
advertisements, tawdry books and magazines, and other 'offensive' intrusions which
increasingly attend urban life."). Privacy screens may make the screen so dark that elderly
patrons or others who have sight limitations have difficulty reading the contents of the
screen.
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librarian may be disciplined for intentionally causing distress to the library
staff. Second, the library could institute a rule that patrons must blank out
the screen or go to a screen without images before the library staff will
assist them. Ultimately, however, if none of these approaches fully ensures
that library staff will not find themselves confronted with offensive images,
patrons' ability to examine Web sites of their choice should take
precedence over the desire to spare library staff from suffering offense.
Such potential exposure to offensive material should be viewed as an
unavoidable aspect of the librarian's job.1
69
The Supreme Court's doctrine upholding zoning restrictions on
sexually explicit commercial enterprises suggests a potential third
instrumentalist argument in support of installing Internet filters. The
Supreme Court has held that a local government may regulate speech,
especially sexually explicit speech, to combat the speech's secondary
effects. 70 Thus, the Court has allowed localities to use zoning laws to
control the location of businesses that offer sexually explicit materials
because such businesses tend to have negative effects on the surrounding
neighborhoods---effects which include increasing crime, producing blight,
and reducing property values.
171
Librarians might reasonably fear that the availability of Internet
pornography could change the character of the library. Instead of a place
visited by a broad cross-section of the community, the library might
become a publicly funded "peep show" for those interested in sexually
explicit material. Indeed, people uninterested in sexually explicit material
might come to view the library as a place to be avoided, just as a wide
segment of the public avoids the "red-light" districts that exist in many
cities. In short, if sexually explicit materials can be accessed at a public
library, the library's clientele might change in undesirable ways.
A secondary effects argument in the library context, however, seems
strained. A public library might find it difficult to demonstrate that making
sexually explicit material available to patrons will either produce criminal
activity in or around the library or adversely affect the library's aesthetic
169. There may be other, more technical reasons that such a suit will fail. Application of
"Community Standards" Component of Legal Obscenity Test to Librarians' Internet
Communications, Mem. from Jenner & Block to the Am. Library Ass'n, supra note 143, at
16-18.
170. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
171. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48, 54; Young, 427 U.S. at 55, 71 n.34. See JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsrTTUmONAL LAW (5th ed. 1995); David L. Hudson, Jr., The
Secondary Effects Doctrine: "The Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms," 37
WASHBURN L.J. 55 (1997).
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qualities. 72 Moreover, the library can presumably address any concrete
harms by implementing specific rules directed at those harms. More
fundamentally, a secondary effects argument based on concern about the
exodus of patrons offended by the availability of sexually explicit materials
in the library parallels secondary effects arguments that the Supreme Court
has rejected in the past. In Boos v. Barry,'74 the Supreme Court
overturned a decision upholding a District of Columbia ordinance that
prevented the display of signs "bring[ing] a foreign government into public
odium or public disrepute" within 500 feet of foreign embassies.175 The
District of Columbia Circuit had upheld the ordinance using the secondary
effects rationale. The Supreme Court explained, however, that its
secondary effects doctrine could not justify the ordinance because the
reactions of people to speech and the emotive impact of speech on
audiences cannot be considered secondary effects of speech. Boos
suggests that a secondary effects argument would be rejected in the public
library context. In particular, any exodus from the library as a result of the
availability of sexually explicit material via the Internet would ultimately
result from the reactions of some patrons to communications between Web
178site owners and willing library patrons.
As a fourth instrumentalist justification, libraries could assert that
Internet filters may further public libraries' mission of helping the readers
172. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court rejected a similar argument. There, the government
argued that it could restrict sexually explicit speech to foster the growth of the Internet by
making sure that countless citizens were not driven away from the medium because of the
risk that they would expose themselves or their children to such sexually explicit material.
521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997). The Court had earlier rejected the government's argument, which
was explicitly based on Renton. Id at 867.
173. Forsyth Co., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). In particular, the argument that offensive speech will lead to an
exodus of people really focuses on listeners' reactions to speech and the emotive impact of
the speech on the audience.
174. 485 U.S. 312.
175. Id. at 316.
176. Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1469 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'g Boos, 458 U.S.
312.
177. Id. at 321 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I
also join Part 1-A to the extent it concludes that even under the analysis set forth in
[Renton], the display clause constitutes a content-based restriction on speech that merits
strict scrutiny. Whatever 'secondary effects' means, I agree that it cannot include listeners'
reactions to speech.").
178. Granted, the relevant impact is not that on the audience to whom the speech is
directed, but on those who may be unintentionally confronted by the speech. This
difference, however, should not be dispositive. Rather, bystanders should be expected to
avert their eyes from offensive speech. Moreover, it is far from clear than people who might
find themselves confronted by the potentially offensive materials would leave the vicinity.
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negotiate a vast array of materials on subjects that vary greatly in quality.179
Librarians have traditionally assisted patrons in negotiating a wealth of
materials on various subjects. Some have suggested that this function will
become more, not less, critical with the Internet's arrival.180 There is little
reason, however, to prevent those who wish to access the Internet without
filters from doing so if filters are justified only as a means for assisting
patrons in winnowing material.
A public library should not be restricted to such instrumentalist
justifications for employing filtering software. Even public librarians
should possess the authority to prefer speech regarding intellectual inquiry
to sexually explicit speech because of their conception of the library as a
forum, regardless of whether librarians can point to any concrete injury that
would result from reconceptualizing the library's mission. Libraries engage
in a wide range of activities. Sexually explicit materials may differ from
traditional library materials in a way that should simply allow librarians to
prefer traditional materials. Historically, libraries have been viewed as
places that offer material to provide intellectual stimulation and
enlightenment, although this view may contain some elements of myth.
Certainly, contemporary public libraries contain materials other than those
dedicated to intellectual inquiry. Libraries seek to provide entertainment by
offering materials embodying popular culture, such as videotapes of
popular movies and romance novels-materials not necessarily intended to
enlighten or stimulate the intellect. 18 Indeed, some have suggested that
libraries' efforts to cater to popular tastes undermine the vital role of
libraries in a democracy.182 That debate need not be resolved to conclude
that libraries should be allowed to prefer intellectual inquiries to the
satisfaction of other patron interests.
Librarians should have the discretion to decide that the library is
committed to intellectual inquiry, not to the satisfaction of the full range of
human desires."" They should also have the authority to decide that scarce
179. Nadel, supra note 11, at 1137.
180. Id.
181. Jeannette Allis Bastian, Filtering the Internet in American Public Libraries: Sliding
Down the Slippery Slope, available at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue2_lO/bastian/
index.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2001).
From the early days of the public library, librarians sought on the one hand to
elevate public thought, and on the other, to meet public demand[;] [tihe role of the
librarian as arbiter of good reading and social values versus that of mass market
distributor is a thread that continues to run through the professional literature.
Id.
182. Hafner & Sterling-Folker, supra note 70, at 28, 34.
183. National Coalition Against Censorship, The Cyber-Library: Legal and Policy Issues
Facing Public Libraries in the High-Tech Era, reprinted in FILTERS & FREEDOM, supra note
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computer resources should be devoted to intellectual inquiry rather than the
pursuit of entertainment. Thus, a librarian can decide that he wishes to
reserve Internet terminals for intellectual inquiry, rather than for engaging
in electronic communication with other individuals, shopping, playing
computer games, or satisfying prurient interests.
Libraries should be able to limit recreational uses as a symbolic
matter, without showing any kind of nonspeech danger the library seeks to
avoid. With regard to recreational materials, public libraries should have
the power to limit such material simply because that is the way in which
the polity wishes to define the forum, much like the federal government
could decide, in Alexander, that it did not wish to sell sexually explicit
material that had been forfeited to the federal government, or, as in General
Media, that it would not sell sexually explicit material in military post-
exchanges.1 4 Libraries should be required to treat all materials for
intellectual inquiry equally (at least in terms of allowing patrons to access
such materials on the Internet), but be permitted to treat some or all
categories of recreational material less favorably by precluding patrons
from using valuable computer time to engage in such recreational pursuits.
Within the sphere of material that provides knowledge or intellectual
stimulation, public libraries should be required to justify limitations on the
range of inquiry. Thus, unlike designated public fora, where the
government can set the substantive bounds of the debate,"' public libraries
should presumptively be open to all intellectual inquiries. Because libraries
are the archetypal fora for listeners, library patrons should have access to
any speech protected by the First Amendment, just as speakers can access
streets or parks to engage in any expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment. Such a presumption is consistent with the history of public
libraries in this country.
Moreover, perhaps counterintuitively, courts should take a much more
jaundiced view of library policies that block Internet access to a very
limited array of subjects than they take of library policies that reserve
Internet terminals for very limited use. Intuitively, the fewer restrictions on
the intellectual inquiries that can be pursued by use of the Internet-
accessible terminals, the better. For example, a policy that allows access to
everything except sites devoted to discussion of religious doctrine may
seem much less objectionable than a policy that reserves Internet-accessible
terminals to those who wish to access government information.
12, at 150-51.
184. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
185. Supreme Court doctrine merely requires a government entity to consistently follow
its own definition of the forum. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53
Number 2] FILTH, FILTERING, FIRSTAMENDMENT
The more widespread the limitation on Internet use in public libraries,
however, the more likely that political processes will ensure that the
limitations on such use are no broader than necessary. In particular, in the
second situation posited above (in which Internet-accessible terminals
could be used only to access government Web sites), a large portion of the
general public is treated unfavorably with respect to the subjects they wish
to explore by way of the Internet. Thus, it will take a strong justification for
the library to maintain a severely restrictive policy governing use of
Internet-accessible computers because of the wide scope of unfavorable
treatment. On the other hand, if patrons can explore all of the subjects that
they wish to explore by Internet-accessible terminals, and only a small
segment of the public is denied use of the Internet terminals for their
preferred inquiries, political pressure from such a small segment of patrons
will likely have less effect.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted in several contexts that
requiring the general application of rules intended to apply only to small
segments of the populace provides a particularly practical and effective
method of discouraging arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions on political
minorities.186 Supreme Court doctrine regarding taxation of the news media
reflects just such an approach. The Court has held that the news media may
be subjected to taxes applicable to business enterprises in general, but that
states may not tax media entities more heavily than other business entities,
nor may states single out a small segment of the media for heavier taxation
than the remainder of the media.187 Yet, at the same time, the Court has
permitted states to accord especially favorable treatment to a small segment
of the media by exempting that segment from a general tax paid by most
businesses, including many other media entities.88 Allowing favorable
treatment of only a small segment of the media resembles a library's policy
186. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1944) (observing
that "[t]he framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to
require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally").
187. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,445-46 (1991).
188. Id. at 450-53. In particular, the Court allowed Arkansas to exempt newspapers and
magazines from its sales tax. See Mabee v. White Plains Publ'g Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184
(1946); Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 194 (1946). Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), may provide another example of the
Court's greater acceptance of treating a small group especially favorably rather than
especially unfavorably. There, the Court upheld a statute that allowed tax-exempt veterans
groups to involve themselves in lobbying Congress, even though in general groups holding
tax-exempt status cannot engage in lobbying activities. Id. at 545-50. It is unlikely that the
Court would have upheld a statute allowing all tax-exempt groups except veterans groups to
lobby.
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of providing a very limited range of access to the Internet. In both
circumstances, a limited range of speech interests are favored, and such
favoritism is not troubling because of the political constraints on such
favoritism.!
IV. WHO DECIDES AND How?: PROFESSIONALISM,
INSULATION, DELEGATION, AND PROCESS
Government may further constitutional principles not only through
the application of substantive doctrines, such as the listener-focused
"public forum" doctrine, but by structural and procedural requirements
limiting the manner in which government adopts actions that have
implications for constitutional rights. 90 This section of the Article explores
structural and procedural constraints that courts might consider placing
upon libraries that seek to employ filtering software on their computers.
The question of the authority to determine which sites warrant blocking
merits analysis. The contours of the process by which a patron can seek to
unblock a site also merit attention.
Any government effort to limit undesirable speech will likely produce
at least one of two consequences. First, the government may inadvertently
prohibit some speech that does not actually bear the relevant deleterious
characteristics. Second, in an effort to make more refined judgments that
reduce the blockage of appropriate speech, the government may rely on
discretionary, case-by-case judgments to distinguish permissible from
impermissible speech. Such judgments carry the risk of inconsistent or
potentially biased decisionmaking. Often the government's effort to limit
speech will suffer from both of the above maladies. Such problems may
become magnified in the filtering context because of imperfections in
current filtering software. Filters will invariably be overinclusive; they will
block some sites that do not produce the relevant harms.' 9' For instance,
filters designed to block only pornographic sites also block numerous sites
that in no way appeal to the prurient interest. If the standards for blocking
189. In circumstances where there are likely to be fewer constraints on such favoritism,
such as where elected officials exempt themselves or political allies from generally
applicable obligations, taking a permissible approach toward favoritism is more
problematic. See Bell, supra note 43, at 809 n.293.
190. Henry D. Monoghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. Rnv. 518, 518
(1970) (stating that "courts have lately come to realize that procedural guarantees play an
equally large role in protecting freedom of speech indeed, they assume an importance fully
as great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied").
191. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Faulty Filters: How Content Filters Block
Access to Kid-Friendly Information on the Internet, reprinted in FILTERS & FREEDOM, supra
note 12, at 53-66; The Connorsware Project, Censored Internet Access in Utah Public
Schools and Libraries, reprinted in FILTER & FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 1151-52.
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sites are narrowly tailored so that few sites are erroneously blocked, the
software also will likely permit access to many sexually explicit sites that
the library seeks to block. In short, any filtering program designed to block
sexually explicit sites will almost certainly prove substantially
underinclusive or overinclusive. At the same time, many filtering programs
involve blocking sites on the basis of some person's or group's
determination that the sites are inappropriate. This, of course, means that
highly fact-specific determinations are made on a case-by-case basis-
determinations subject to significant hidden biases.
Someone must make substantive decisions about the contents of the
public library. At first glance, it may appear that librarians would determine
the sites that will be filtered out and set the standards for making such
determinations. The locus of decisionmaking power is somewhat more
diffuse, and identifying the true locus of decisionmaking power requires
consideration of the role of filtering software providers, as well as the
elected officials to whom the head librarians report.
Currently, software providers play a large role in deciding which sites
patrons may not access using libraries' computers. Almost invariably,
private entities make the decisions regarding the methodology used to
determine which sites are blocked because they create and design the
blocking software. 9 2 Moreover, such companies often express hesitancy
about divulging the methodologies that they have incorporated into the
software, or even divulging the particular sites that their software packages
block.93 Library officials make the initial decision to purchase a particular
filtering software from among competing products and could decide to
change software at any time. Otherwise, the specific blocking decisions are
made by software producers, not library staff, unless library officials retain
the power to unblock sites by overriding the filtering software.
Frequently, library officials' decisions regarding filtering software
reflect pressure from another source, namely the influence of elected
officials expressing either their own concerns or those of their constituents
regarding the materials available in publicly funded libraries. It is
noteworthy that decisionmaking by elected officials, rather than unelected
librarians, troubled the Pico plurality.194 More generally, much of the
pressure to remove books, use filters, or prohibit art exhibitions comes not
192. Warren, supra note 13, at 56.
193. ACLU, Is Cyberspace Burning?: How Rating and Blocking Proposals May Torch
Free Speech on the Internet, reprinted in FILTERS & FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 15; Lessig,
supra note 137, at 654; Nadel, supra note 11, at 1149 n.167; Santiago, supra note 12, at 266.
194. Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 874-75 (1982). See Tedjeske, supra note 137, at
1292.
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from professional librarian-curators, but from elected officials seeking to
ensure that government resources do not support expressive materials that
conflict with community values (or at least the official's conception of
those community values). Thus, the pressure for filters in the Loudoun and
Boston Public Libraries-the settings of two celebrated filtering
controversies-came not from librarians, but from elected officials. 195 The
pressure to limit the use of other government-owned computers also
originates from elected officials, not lower-level administrators. Thus, the
limitation on computer use by university faculty in Oklahoma and the
statewide restriction on use of computers by government employees in
Virginia began with pressure from elected leaders. 96 The conflict between
Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and the curators of the Brooklyn Museum with
regard to the "Sensations" exhibit provides another dramatic example
outside of the library context.' 97 Similarly, the attacks on the exhibition of
Robert Mapplethorpe's works and the NEA's financial support for such
exhibitions came largely from elected officials, rather than professional
artists and museum curators.
9 8
Two values compete for dominance in this and other First
Amendment contests: insulation and political accountability. Sometimes
the normal political process will produce unsound decisions, either because
public officials refuse to pursue the public interest rather than their own
divergent electoral interests, or because popular majorities prove
insensitive to important interests. Insulating decisionmaking from the
influence of elected officials can diminish this democratic pathology. The
majority's tendency to undervalue the rights of minorities suggests one
reason to adopt such an approach; the electorate establishes governmental
institutions to protect those rights. The most obvious example of such an
institution is the federal judiciary, which the Constitution insulates from
political pressure by granting judges life tenure and salary protection, so
judges may determine the rights of private citizens without being
influenced either by the interests of elected officials or majoritarian
concerns.' 99 Similarly, by statute and custom, law enforcement officials
195. Bastian, supra note 181.
196. Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Okla. 1997); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216
F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
197. Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Sciences v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); Heyman, supra note 18, at 1194-97.
198. Fiss, supra note 15, at 29-33 (discussing Helms's Amendment to prohibit the NEA
from giving funds to Mapplethorpe and the prosecution of a museum director in Cincinnati
under an obscenity statute for displaying Mapplethorpe's work).
199. U.S. CONST. art. m1; FEDERALIST No. 78, 470-71 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[The]
inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, ....
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary
[Vol. 53
Number 2] FILTH, FILTERING, FIRSTAMENDMENT
enjoy considerable insulation from elected officials on both a national and
state level. Such insulation frustrates attempts to use law enforcement
processes, which have a significant effect upon the lives of individuals, for
political purposes, and limits the effect of public passions upon the exercise
of law enforcement discretion.200
Professor Mark G. Yudof has made the argument that government
speech should receive some insulation. He argues that giving teachers
greater independence than other government employees, by granting them
tenure, ensures that government's power to indoctrinate primary and
secondary school students cannot be used for political gain.21 Courts will
almost certainly refuse to compel the political branches of government to
insulate library professionals so that those professionals may make their
decisions regarding public libraries' filtering software absent political
pressure. Courts, however, could adopt the less dramatic approach of
according special deference to the decisions of library professionals while
viewing with skepticism those decisions reflecting exertion of political
pressure on library professionals. Indeed, the Court, in a somewhat oblique
fashion, has on at least one occasion noted that the importance of colleges
and universities in ensuring wide diffusion of knowledge depends on the
relative autonomy the faculties have in making hiring and tenure
202decisions. Moreover, scholars have suggested that recent First
Amendment cases involving government-funded speech may reflect a view
that insulated decisions merit more deference, and many applaud this
commission."); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OFTHE CONSTITUTION 290 (1996).
200. GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNrmEs 176 (1996) (The capacity of
local government to shape police discretion is limited by the success of police reformers
during the first half of the twentieth century to define virtually any political influence over
policy as corrupt influence.); GREGORY HowARD WLmLAms, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF
POLICE DISCRETION 104-07 (1984); Bell, supra note 43, at 816. For example, the director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a guaranteed ten-year term. Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 1101, 82 Stat. 197, 236 (1968), as amended by
Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-503, § 203, 90 Stat. 2407, 2427 (1976). Similarly, the
New Jersey Attorney General is appointed by the Governor for a fixed five-year term and
thus is not removable at the Governor's discretion, insulating the Attorney General from
political pressure.
201. Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak." Toward a Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 863, 876-82 (1979).
202. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,225 (1985).
Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange
of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on
autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself. Discretion to determine, on
academic grounds, who may be admitted to study, has been described as one of
"the four essential freedoms" of a university.
Id. at 226 n.12 (internal citations omitted).
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trend.2°3 In the public library context, this would suggest that courts focus
on whether elected officials or patrons have exerted political influence,
rather than whether a librarian has properly exercised discretion, and on
whether the library has established and followed routine procedures for
identifying sites that patrons cannot access. Decisions in Pico and the
American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin204 suggest that courts might be
particularly reticent about upholding politically inspired book-banning or
use of Internet-filtering software.
Delegating filtering decisions to private software providers arguably
increases the insulation of those decisions from elected officials. °5
Delegations of government power to private individuals, however, may be
206problematic. Courts have noted that the federal Constitution and many
203. Schauer, supra note 33, at 115 ("These library-specific principles might conclude
that this process, when made by a certain cadre of professionals, is constitutionally
permissible, but might conclude as well that external influence in this process by non-
professionals raises First Amendment problems."); Rodney A. Smolla, Freedom of Speech
for Libraries and Librarians, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 71, 73 (1993) (stating that the best hope for
combating censorship in public libraries is adoption of a "professionalism principle" under
which "decisions concerning the content of speech in institutions such as libraries or art
galleries should be insulated from partisan political influence by committing them to the
sound discretion of professionals in the field").
204. 644 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1986). American Council of the Blind involved a
challenge by the Library of Congress to discontinue production of Braille editions of
Playboy magazine. The Library of Congress, through the National Library Service's
Program for the Blind and Physically Handicapped, reproduced books and magazines in
Braille and recorded editions for the visually impaired. Id. at 813. The National Library
Service ("NLS") staff selected the books and magazines to be reproduced using specific
criteria and enlisted advisory committees representing a variety of interests to assist in
applying those criteria. Id. A member of Congress asked the Library of Congress to
discontinue production of Playboy, and, after two internal reviews, the Library concluded
that the Library could not justify discontinuation of Playboy under its criterion. Id. The
Congressman then succeeded in getting the House to pass an amendment reducing the
budget for the Program by the amount of money it took to produce copies of Playboy. IM at
813-14. Thereafter, the Librarian of Congress announced that he would discontinue
production of Braille copies of Playboy. Id. at 814. The Court concluded that the program
was a non-public forum, id. at 815, but that the decision to discontinue Playboy was
viewpoint-based discrimination, id. at 816, the only type of distinction impermissible in the
non-public forum. The Court focused on the fact that the Librarian of Congress's decision
overruled his staff, and that the decision resulted from congressional pressure to eliminate a
magazine even though it met the selection criteria for the program. Id. The Court
characterized the context as "emotionally charged." Id.
205. In this context, however, one might not expect that filtering software providers
would be particularly attuned to First Amendment issues because the software is for use in
households, which are not limited by the First Amendment, as well as in public libraries.
206. Mark S. Nadel, author of one of the leading articles on the constitutionality of
Internet-filtering software use by public libraries, takes this position. Nadel, supra note 11,
at 1146-51 (Granted, Nadel's primary concern is that delegation to private authorities may
frustrate courts' abilities to enforce the substantive First Amendment principle that
viewpoint distinctions may not be made in public fora, by allowing such decisions to be
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state constitutions may limit delegations of governmental power to private
entities,20 7 even though several scholars have argued, to the contrary, that
both federal and state governments regularly delegate power to private
entities without any constitutional challenge.20 Indeed, the federal
government has delegated substantial decisionmaking authority to private
entities regarding one important public resource-the electromagnetic
spectrum. 209 The authority granted to broadcasters is particularly striking
because the First Amendment insulates broadcasters from government
pressure to a certain extent. In this way, broadcasters act as private entities
exercising both free speech rights and power over public property
delegated to them by the federal government.
210
Political accountability lives in tension with insulation as a means for
furthering constitutional values. Sometimes political accountability and
public pressure may well enhance liberty. For example, the Supreme Court
relies on the political process to constrain taxation of mass media outlets in
a way the judiciary would find difficult to do directly. The Court merely
requires that any tax applicable to the media apply broadly to nonmedia
entities as well.211 The Court presumes that broadly applicable taxes are
unlikely to impose unnecessarily harsh burdens because the large segments
of the public to whom the tax applies will exert political pressure to keep
such taxes to a reasonable level.212 A similar principle can be discerned in
the jurisprudence regarding media access to official proceedings and
governmental institutions. The primary protection springs not from a
substantive doctrine under which courts identify the specific proceedings
made by private entities not subject to judicial review.) Particularly on the federal level, the
conventional view of the delegation doctrine is that it largely limits delegation of
"legislative" authority to private entities and groups. Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414, 424
(1944) (explaining that delegation to Schechter Poultry was invalidated, in part, because
"[t]he function of formulating the codes was delegated not to a public official responsible to
Congress or the Executive, but to private individuals engaged in the industries to be
regulated"); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (invalidating
section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act as an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority).
207. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647
(1986).
208. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543
(2000); Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of
Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assigning Federal Power to Non-federal
Actors, 50 RUTGER L. REv. 331 (1998); Lawrence, supra note 207.
209. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394-96 (1981); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18, 121, 125 (1973); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
389-90 (1969).
210. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,478 (1984).
211. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
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and institutions open to the press, but rather a requirement that the
government treat the press no worse than it would treat the general public.
The courts then rely upon the political process to ensure that government
carefully considers limiting citizens' rights to gain access to proceedings
and institutions.213
One legitimate criticism of the ethos of noninterference with law
enforcement rests on the argument that majoritarian influence can, in some
instances, enhance liberty.214 As long as the electorate seeks to exert
influence at the level of broad policies rather than particular situations, the
majoritarian process may have a constraining effect on law enforcement.
For example, some of the limitations on police officers' authority to engage
in intrusive and harmful activities that threaten citizen's life and liberty,
such as the use of life-threatening force, the high-speed pursuit of
lawbreakers, and the conduct of strip searches when arrestees are placed in
215detention facilities, have resulted, at least in part, from political pressure.
At times, the Court may require elected officials to make certain
decisions because those officials will likely prove more protective of rights
than the appointed officials to whom the elected officials have delegated
216decisionmaking power. For example, in Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong,
several resident aliens challenged a regulation barring noncitizens from
federal government employment, asserting that the regulation violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The Court acknowledged that
the federal government's power over aliens is "subject only to narrow
judicial review, ' 217 because of "the political character of the power over
immigration and naturalization. ' '2"' The Court also acknowledged that the
Civil Service Commission "ha[s] identified several interests which the
Congress or the President might deem sufficient to justify the exclusion of
non-citizens from the federal service., 219  Nevertheless, the Court
invalidated the provision, reasoning that only Congress or the President
could invoke the interests justifying such an exclusion from employment,
213. Bell, supra note 43.
214. Herman Goldstein, Confronting the Complexity of the Police Function, in
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND
CONFORMITY 53 (Lloyd Olin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993); GREGORY HOWARD
WILLIAMS, THE LAW AND THE POLITICS OF POLICE DISCRETION 114-22, 139-40 (1984); Bell,
supra note 43, at 815.
215. Bell, supra note 43, at 815 n.320.
216. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
217. Id. at 101 n.21.
218. Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
219. Id. at 103-04. These interests included the President's use of employment as a
bargaining tool in negotiating treaties and encouraging aliens to seek citizenship. See id. at
104.
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and that the Civil Service Commission could point to no congressional or
presidential consideration of the issue.220 Moreover, the Civil Service
Commission's responsibilities did not include the type of foreign affairs
and naturalization concerns that could justify such a limitation on
employment.221 The Court concluded that:
[s]ince these residents were admitted as a result of decisions made by
the Congress and the President, implemented by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service acting under the Attorney General of the United
States, due process requires that the decision to impose th[e]
deprivation of an important liberty interest [in potential federal
employment] be made at a comparable level of government or, if it is
to be permitted to be made by the Civil Service Commission, that it be
justified by reasons which are properly the concern of the agency.222
Thus, in an area where substantive constitutional doctrines provided
little vindication of constitutional principles22 (because the issues involved
political questions dedicated to other branches of government), the Court
encouraged adherence to those principles by requiring Congress and the
President to explicitly consider the need to contravene those principles.
Similarly, the Supreme Court views federal agencies' preemption of state
law much more skeptically than congressional preemption of state law.224
Some commentators and jurists have long held the view that the primary
protections of state authority lie not in substantive constitutional law, but in
the political protections provided by virtue of Congress's composition.2z
Indeed, prior to recent efforts to reinvigorate substantive constitutional
limits on congressional power vis-bL-vis the states, much of the Supreme
220. Id. at 104-14.
221. See id at 104-05, 114-15.
222. Il at 116 (citation omitted).
223. The Court had already held, for instance, that a state cannot ban noncitizens from
state employment. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973). It had also ruled that a
state could not preclude noncitizens from admission to the bar. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
729 (1973).
224. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Medical Labs, Inc., 417 U.S. 707, 713, 717, 721
(1985). See David A. Herrman, Comment, To Delegate or Not to Delegate-That Is
Preemption: The Lack of Political Accountability in Administrative Preemption Defies
Federalism Constraints on Government Power, 28 PAC. L.. 1157, 1182 (1997).
225. Herbert Weschler long ago suggested the difficulty of crafting neutral principles to
cabin Congress's Commerce Clause power. Rather, he maintained, the political processes in
which states are fully represented could better protect states than judicially created
principles enforced by litigation. See Herbert Weschler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954); Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 23-24 (1959). Jessee Choper has since expanded
the argument. See JESSEE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REviEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PRocEss 175-254 (1980); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTnTUnTON
104-05 (1987).
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Court's approach to federal-state relations consisted of ensuring that the
states' political protections worked effectively by requiring Congress to
address federalism issues in a highly visible manner.22' Agency structure
and composition would appear to provide states with substantially less
political protection. Courts' reluctance to grant agencies broad authority to
interpret statutes in ways that mandate or allow preemption of state law
could in part be attributed to a judicial concern that agencies bear much less
accountability to states than Congress (and, thus, that the scope of
preemption will be far more constrained if Congress must explicitly
provide for preemption than if agencies can construe ambiguous statutes as
preemptive).2 7
This principle would suggest a limitation on delegation of authority to
private entities. The kinds of political constraints that cabin public officials'
actions do not similarly constrain actions by private entities. Moreover,
228private entities may use public resources for their own private purposes,
and inhibit speech in ways that serve those private purposes, thus posing no
less of a threat to First Amendment values than do public actors. Overall, it
seems most likely that courts' encouragement of librarians to make
decisions about blocked sites will protect libraries' ability to accommodate
wide-ranging inquiry. Courts provide such encouragement by giving
librarians' judgments greater deference when there is no evidence of
political or patron pressure and by requiring libraries to learn filtering
software providers' methodology for determining which sites to block.
Courts could also require public libraries to retain the power to unblock
sites by overriding the filtering software altogether.2 9
226. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) ("[I]nasmuch as this Court in
Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive
exercises of Congress' Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that
Congress intended such an exercise."); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 171, §
4.10, at 192-93.
227. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 331 (2000).
228. Lawrence, supra note 207, at 659-62, 682-87 (Courts are reticent about delegation
of governmental power to private persons because of a concern that the delegated
governmental power will be used to further the interests of the private actor rather than the
public interest, and such a conflict of interest in the decisionmaker can be considered a
violation of due process.).
229. Courts, however, cannot expect libraries to act with the independence that other
autonomous agencies display, even though the American Library Association urges libraries
to resist such pressures. AM. LIBRARY ASS'N POLICY MANUAL, supra note 70, 53.1.1; see
also id. H1 53.1, 53.1.15. Libraries, as service agencies, depend to a greater extent on the
citizenry than other institutions that exercise some autonomy. For example, police
departments have available to them coercive powers and are thus less dependent upon
pleasing the citizenry. Moreover, citizens are hardly likely to abolish a police department
even if they are dissatisfied with its policies. Similarly, the courts and the Federal Reserve
have either coercive powers or regulatory powers that make them much less vulnerable to
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Another procedural issue arises primarily because of the fallibility of
filters. The First Amendment might grant some leeway to a public library
in blocking sites that do not pose the relevant problems, but there must be
some way in which patrons can learn which sites are blocked and contest
the legitimacy of the blocking. Part of the "delegation" problem, a lack of
public accountability, stems from the fact that allowing a library to
purchase blocking software without securing the power to remove the
block threatens to prevent a patron from getting inappropriate blocks
removed.
A private software provider's decision to design its product to block
certain sites may not constitute state action, constrained by the demands of
the First Amendment. Moreover, a software provider is not necessarily
focused on First Amendment concerns, because households, as well as
public libraries, use such software. Heads of households are not subjected
to the same First Amendment analysis as public libraries. The courts could
hold that blocking decisions should be considered governmental decisions
constrained by the First Amendment even when they are made for a public
library by private software providers, and thus allow patrons to contest the
software provider's blocking decisions. The courts, however, would then
be in the business of addressing questions of the correctness of blocking
decisions in the first instance. Requiring libraries to learn the
methodologies underlying filtering software and to determine the validity
of specific blocking reduces judicial involvement, and, at the same time,
places such determinations in the hands of those who can reasonably be
expected to make sound decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Constitutional constraints on public libraries' installation of Internet
filtering software confronts the courts yet again with a dilemma that has
long bedeviled the federal judiciary-the precise contours of government
power when the government affects popular behavior by the manner in
which it expends resources. The traditional approach to resolving this issue,
at least with regard to speech on government property, must be reevaluated
in the context of public libraries. Libraries represent a unique type of forum
heretofore unrecognized by the courts. They are a forum for the receipt of
information, not for speaking. Courts must recognize the constitutional
implications of this difference, and only when they do so can they properly
address the issues raised by Internet access in public libraries.
the displeasure of a substantial portion of the populace.

